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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.
II.

CONSIDERATION EXISTED FOR THE PROMISSORY NOTE THEREBY
MAKING IT VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AGAINST DEFENDANT.
THE PROMISSORY NOTE WAS COMPLETE AND SUFFICIENT IN ITS
TERMS SO AS TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE VARYING THE TERMS THEREOF.
STATUTES

7QA-3-408, U.C.A. 1953, as amended:
Consideration. Want or failure of consideration is a
defense as against any person not having the rights of
a holder in due course (Section 70A-3-305), except that
no consideration is necessary for an instrument or
obligation thereon given in payment of or as security
for an antecedent obligation of any kind. Nothing in
this section shall be taken to displace any statute
outside this act under which a promise is enforceable
notwithstanding lack or failure of consideration.
Partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto
whether or not the failure is in an ascertained or
liquidated amount.
78-25-16, U.C.A. 1953, as amended:
Parol evidence of contents of writing—When admissible.
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing,
other than the writing itself, except in the following
cases:
(1) When the original has been lost or destroyed, in
which case proof of the loss or destruction must
first be made.
(2) When the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered and he fails to
produce it after reasonable notice.
(3) When the original is a record or other document in
the custody of a public officer.

1

(4) When the original has been recorded, and the record
or a certified copy thereof is made evidence by this
code or other statute.
(5) When the original consists of numerous accounts
or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time, and the evidence
sought from them is only the general result of the
whole.
Provided, however, if any business,
institution, member of a profession
or calling, or any department or
agency of a government, in the
regular course of business or activity
has kept or recorded any memorandum,
writing, entry, print, representation
or combination thereof, of any act,
transaction, occurrence or event, and
in the regular course of business has
caused any or all of the same to be
recorded, copied or reproduced by any
photographic, photostatic, microfilm,
microcard, miniature photographic, or
other process which accurately reproduces
or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the original, and the original
may be destroyed in the regular course
of business unless held in a custodial
or fiduciary capacity or unless its
preservation is required by law; and
such reproduction, when satisfactorily
identified, is as admissible in evidence
as the original itself in any judicial
or administrative proceeding whether
the original is in existence or not, and
an enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in
evidence if the original reproduction is
in existence and available for inspection

2

under direction of court. The
introduction of a reproduced
record, enlargement or facsimile,
does not preclude admission of the
original.
In the cases mentioned in subdivisions
(3) and (4), a copy of the original, or
of the record, must be produced; in those
mentioned in subdivisions (1) and (2),
either a copy or oral evidence of the
contents.

J70A-3-104, U.C.A. 1953, as amended:
Form of negotiable instruments--"praft", "Check" "Certificate
of Deposit , "Note", CD Any writing to be a negotiable
instrument within this chaper must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b)

contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a
sum certain in money and no other promise, order,
obligation or power given by the maker or drawer
except as authorized by this chapter; and

(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A Complaint was filed in the instant case on March 23, 1983,
in the Third Dictrict Court in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah.

3

A trial was held before Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup,
District Judge, Third District Court, on September 27, 1984.
He issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
December 21, 1984, where he ordered the Complaint to be
dismissed on the merits as no cause of action.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Harold Okubo, a West Jordan produce farmer, was contacted
by his nephew Byron and informed of the business investments
of Byron's employer, Dr. George R. Parker.

Mr. Okubo eventually

spoke directly with Dr. Parker, who invited him to his office
for further discussion regarding investing (R. 7-9; 89-90).

Dr.

Parker, a dentist, had invested approximately $200,000 in the
Martell Corporation, a company engaged in the diamond importexport business and a dehydrated food processing and sales operation.
Dr. Parker indicated that he had been receiving favorable returns
on his investment (R. 47).
Mr. Okubo was interested in investing himself in the Martell
Corporation, but was uncomfortable doing so with people and a
company with which he was unfamiliar (R. 90, 104). Dr. Parker
offered his personal promissory note as backup for any money
Mr. Okubo should invest (R. 9,33).

On the basis of Dr. Parker's

guarantee, on January 14, 1980, Mr. Okubo gave Dr. Parker his

4

check for $40,000 made out to Sterling Martell of the Martell
Corporation.

At the same time, Dr. Parker executed a promissory

note for $40,000 in favor of Mr. Okubo "as an accommodation to
both Mr. Okubo and Mr. Martell"

(R. 69; 76-77).

The note was

dated January 14, 1980, and due January 14, 1981.
During 1980 the Martell Corporation repaid $10,000 to Mr.
Okubo, but by January 14, 1981, he had failed to receive any
additional amounts (R. 10). On March 23, 1983, having received
no payment after demand for such on the promissory note, Mr.
Okubo filed a complaint against Dr. Parker on the note.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The subject promissory note is supported by

consideration and as such is a valid intrument which is
entitled to enforcement according to its terms.
II.

The court below erred in allowing parol evidence to

vary the terms of the promissory note.

ARGUMENT
I.

CONSIDERATION EXISTED FOR THE PROMISSORY NOTE
THEREBY MAKING IT" VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AGAINST
DEFENDANT
A

*

Consideration:

Benefit to the Promisor

In accordance with the rules relating to other contracts,

it is well settled that as between the immediate parties to a
note, a sufficient consideration is essential to the existence
of a valid and binding undertaking.

10 C.J.S. 5143 p. 599.

The rules relating to the consideration for contracts
generally determine what constitutes sufficient consideration
for the undertaking of a party to a note.
sufficient to support a simple contract.

Value is any consideration
There is sufficient

consideration if there is any benefit, profit, or advantage to
the promisor or any loss, detriment, or inconvenience to the
promisee.

10 C.J.S.

5148(a) p. 601; Uniform Commercial Code,

§70A-3-408, U.C.A. 1953, as amended (Official Comment 3);
Hallowell v. Turner, 94 Ida 718, 496 P.2d 955 (1972).
By the time Mr. Okubo invested his $40,000 on January 14,
1980, Dr. Parker had already invested the following in the
Martell Corporation:

(See Supplemental Interrogatory #11 and

R. 80-82)
DATE
9/15/78
10/3/78
10/4/78
4/27/79
TOTAL:

AMOUNT
$59,799.85
15,385.22

ITEM

52,898.78

Diamonds
Rubies or Diamonds
(See R. 81, 84)
Diamonds

65,000.00

Cash

$193,083.85
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The infusing of an additional $40,000 into a company
where Dr. Parker already had a substantial investment was a
definite benefit to Dr. Parker*

His interest in the stability

and ongoing performance of the Martell Corporation was extremely
high*

The viability of the company was more likely to continue

and improve with the addition of each capital contribution, and
a strong Martell Corporation made it more likely that Dr. Parker
would preserve and realize returns on his own investment*
There was a benefit to the promisor, Dr. Parker, through
a strengthened Martell Corporation and the increased likelihood
that he would recoup his own substantial investment.

Thus,

consideration did exist to support the $40,000 promissory note.

B.

Consideration:

Loss or Detriment to the Promisee

Consideration also exists if there is any loss, detriment
or inconvenience to the promisee.

It is not necessary that

any benefit should accrue to the promisor if something of
value flows from the promisee or he suffers some prejudice
or inconvenience and the promise is the inducement of the
transaction.

10 C.J.S. §148(a) p. 601.

Harold Okubo, the promisee, experienced a loss.
of value, namely $40,000, flowed from him.

Something

Thus, under this

aspect of consideration, consideration did exist to support
the promissory note and render it viable and enforceable
against the defendant.
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C.

Consideration:

Benefit to a Third Person

The consideration or benefit need not necessarily pass
or flow to the promisor*

If given at the instance or request

of the promisor, there may be a sufficient consideration in
the form of a benefit given to a third person.

10 G.J.S* §148(b)

p. 602.
Restatement of Contracts, Section 75(2) provides:
Consideration may be given to the promisor or to some
other person.

Illustration 6 of this subsection coincides with

the instant fact situation:
6.

A makes a promissory note payable to B in
return for a payment by B to C. The
payment is consideration for the note.

A bargained-for consideration may be given to the promisor
or to some other person.

Investment Properties of Ashville,

Inc. v. Norburn, 281 N.C. 191, 188 S.E. 2d 342, 343-344 (1972);
Alexander v. DeLaCruz> 545 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1976);

Unruh

v. Nevada National Bank, 88 Nev 427, 498 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1972);
T & S Assn. v. Superior Court. 4 Cal.App.3d 435, 84 Cal. Rptr.
421, 423 (1970).
Dr. Parker signed a note promising to pay Harold Okubo
$40,000 on January 14, 1981. Mr. Okubo endorsed a check
payable to Sterling Martell of the Martell Corporation in the
amount of $40,000. The benefit of the $40,000 flowed immediately
to Mr. Martell, a third party, and not to the promisor, Dr.
Parker. Under the foregoing definition for consideration,
the note is supported by consideration to a third party.
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D#

Consideration:

Some Valid Consideration is Adequate

Some valid or valuable consideration is all that the
law requires to support the undertaking of a party to a bill
or note.

If such a consideration exists, its adequacy or

sufficiency as compared to the value of the thing promised
is ordinarily immaterial in the absence of fraud, mistake,
or undue influence.

The undertaking may be supported by a

consideration of a most trifling nature or a consideration
having no value in the monetary sense and it is in no way
requisite that the consideration for a bill or note be
adequate in value to the face amount of the instrument.
10 C.J.S. §H8(c) p. 603.
The increased likelihood that Dr. Parker would
recoup his own investment because of the additional $40,000
capital contribution of Mr. Okubo to the Martell Corporation
meets the test for the foregoing aspect of consideration.
There is a benefit to the promisor, Dr. Parker, but no
specific monetary valuation can be attributed to the advantage.
The benefit is more than merely trifling; it has some valid
value.

Thus, again, one must conclude that consideration

exists for Dr. Parkerfs promissory note.
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II.

THE PROMISSORY NOTE IS COMPLETE AND SUFFICIENT
IN ITS TERMS SO AS TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE VARYING
THE TERMS THEREOF.

The promissory note of Dr. Parker is a valid, enforceable
promissory note sufficient in its terms.

It meets the require-

ments for a negotiable note under §70A-3-104, U.C.A. 1953, as
amended;
To be negotiable, a note must:
(1) Be signed by the maker.
(2) Contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum
certain.
(3) Be payable on demand or at a definite time.
(4) Be payable to order or bearer.
The subject promissory note was signed by Dr. George Parker,
the wording promises payment without condition, it is payable
for the certain sum of $40,000, is payable on January 14, 1981,
and is payable to the order of "Hutch" (Harold) Okubo.
Consequently, the note is a valid instrument, sufficient in
its terms, which should be enforced according to the explicit
wording on its face.
As a valid written agreement, in the absence of fraud or
mistake, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary,
add to, or subtract from the terms of the agreement.

Fox Film

Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co.. 82 U. 279, 17 P.2d 294; Last Chance
v. Erickson, 25 P.2d 952 (Utah 1933).
Although Mr. Okubo (R. 35), Dr. Parker (R. 71), and Mr.
Martell (R. 122) all testified that the promissory note
constituted the only written agreement between the parties and
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that there were no additional contracts between them, the
Defendant was allowed to introduce testimony to vary the terms
of the note*

The testimony consisted of oral representations

intended to limit the effectiveness and duration of the note.
The oral explanations were in conflict with the written terms
of the agreement.
In McCornick v. Levy, 37 U. 134, 106 P. 660 (1910), a suit
to foreclose a mortgage, contemporaneous and collateral oral
agreements were not admissible to show that the note and
mortgage were to be payable in merchandise.

The court said

that where parties have deliberately put their contract in
writing the agreement cannot be overturned nor varied by
showing a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement which is in
conflict with the written agreement.

In Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden

Theatre Co., 82 U. 279, 17 P.2d 294, an action for money due
under a written contract for leasing news reel films, evidence
of oral representations of plaintifffs salesman as to when and
how films were to be delivered and that they would be the
latest issues was inadmissible.
Under §78-25-16, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, there can be no
evidence of the contents of a writing other than the writing
itself, except:
(1) When the original has been lost or destroyed.
(2) When the original is in the possession of the party
against whom it is offered.
(3) When the original is in the custody of a public officer.
(4) When the original has been recorded and the record or
a certified copy thereof is made evidence by this code
or other statute.
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(5) When the original consists of numerous accounts.

The instant promissory note does not fall within any of
the exceptions to the foregoing statute.

Therefore, there

can be no evidence of the contents of the note presented other
than the note itself.
CONCLUSION
The $40,000 promissory note of Defendant George Parker in
favor of Plaintiff Harold Okubo is a valid written agreement,
supported by consideration, which should be enforced according
to its terms without allowance for oral explanation to vary
its content.
The Order of the lower court should be reversed with judgment
given in favor of the Plaintiff in the sum of $76,695.00 as of
September 27, 1984, attorneyfs fees of $4,042.00, together with
costs incurred herein.

Further, the court should award an

additional $1,500.00 for attorney's fees incurred on the Appeal.
As an alternative, the case should be remanded to the lower court
for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

6

day of May, 1985,

iff-Appellant
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PROMISSORY NOTE (Interest)

JIM

.1.4

„&).

• undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order

Fxt sJ.

K.£<5

ng. Ih. .um *.. .J^\E:Xl..

-

t4ui<:.M

, S'A./x.x...a.i.c.e
-/

QLCuJScQ.

., Utah, or at such other place as the holder hereof snoy designate

/ M6'

lh«Q..kAJ^JfciU^..j4&-

/

V'r^Dollor. ($ ifOOUCu.).

poyobltie os follows*

»r both before and offer Judgment, with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from dote until paid at the rote of TJBxLtft^ p%t cent (.io^J ' % )
num, interest payable as followsi

Jf^y/

Itf . 1<£?l

repoyme.it of this note with interest to date of payment may be made of any time without penalty.
f the holder deems itself insecure or if default be mode )n payment of the whole or any part of any installment at the time when or the pine©
the tome becomes dv and payable as aforesaid, then the entire unpaid balance, with interest as aforesaid, shall, ot the election of the holder
nnd w thout notice of said election at once become due and payable. In event of any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly and
My agree to pay to the holder hereof reasonable attorney's fees, legal expenses and lawful collection costs ie oddition to all other sun.t dum
^der

'resentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of time without notice ard hereby waived and the undersigned consent to the
e of any i«curiry, or any port thereof, with or without substity

/
2 K M P R I N T I N O <\0

- SALT I A K I CITY. UTAH

- 1

RAIPH J. MARSH, ESQ. A2092
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH
Attorneys for Defendant
800 Mclntyre liuilding
G8 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 8-1101
Telephone: 531-8300

' 9.1 1984

(I
/

IN TIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JIJDK LAI DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
**********
IIAHOID K. OKUIJT),

I'lamt iff,

FINDINGS (Jl FA(T AND
" O0NC1J iSK)Ns"by I .AW

vs.

GEORGE R. PARKER,

( i v i 1 N.i. ( 8 3 - 2 2 2 5
lJef e n d a n t .
* » * • • * » • • •

THE AH0\T: MATTER having cane on l o r t n . i l

t.< l o r e The Honorable

Kenneth Rigt rup on t h e 27th day of Septemlx>r, H»H l, at

10:00 A.M., t h e p l a i n 1

'

a p p e a r i n g and Ix-mg r e p r e s e n t e d by I n s a t t o r n e y , Mall H i l . j a n i r , and the
defendant a p p e a r i n g and b e i n g rt p r e s e n t e d by hit h e p a r t i e s having

presented

a i t t . r n e v , Ralph J . Marsh, anu

t h e i r e v i d e n c e and arguments t o t h e . o u r t and

t h e c o u r t having c o n s i d e r e d t h e m a t t e r , now makes 11-. f i n d i n g s and . one lusi..tc
as tollows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

P l a i n t i l l was c o n t a c t e d b\ h i s n< ph< w, Hvi<>n okubo, alxnit .in

investment with S t e r l i n g M a r t e l l .
2.

P l a i n t i f f was t o l d t h a t he would n . i \\< a r e t u r n on h i s invest"*

el two and o n e - h a l f
3.

( 2 . 5 " ) p e r c e n t per month, ur J h; rt \ (30.OX) j y r e e n t per

y

Defendant had p r e v i o u s l y advanced/IIDIK \ . a •> an invesfyni nt in

Sii-rlinR Mart e l l ' s c o r p » r a t i o n and a l s o achanced l i n t her money t o t h e c o r p o r a '
thereafter.

-2-

-24.

Defendant told plaintiff that he thought it was a good investment.

5.

Plaintiff, defendant and Byron Okubo had some discussions about

diamonds or dried chicken chunks as collateral for the money advanced by plaintltr.
6.

On January 14, 1980, plaintiff wrote out a check to Sterling

Martell in the amount of $40,000.00.
7.

At the request of plaintiff, defendant .signed the document identified

as Exhibit "P-l" to be held by plaintiff until the delivery to plaintiff of
security for his investment.
8.

The check was delivered to Byron Okubo, in the presence of defendar.t ,

and Byron Okubo delivered the check to Sterling Martell.
9.

The check was endorsed and cashed by Stirling Martell in San Franci -

California.
10.

Plaintiff thought he was investing in Martell Corporation and not

in the defendant.
11.

No payment or consideration of any kind was paid to defendant and

none of the money advanced by plaintiff went to the defendant.
12.

Two to three months after the check was written by plaintiff,

plaintiff received from Martell Corporation some documents describing several
cases of dried chicken chunks to be held by plaint if i as s<*curity for plaintiff*^
inve>tment.

One ol the documcmts was to be returned to Mai tell Corporation in

o r V r for plaintiff to take delivery of the security.

Another of the documents

A i > a receipt for the security.
13.

Plaintiff did not return the document or resixjnd in any way or take

inj action to take possession of the security.
14.

Plaintiff was told by Sterling Martell thai the security was being

stored for him.
15.

Except lor one meeting with the defendant, a telephone call from

Merling Martell and the documents received by plaintift

trom Martell Corporation,

all containications by or to plaintiff regarding this in\.^uiient were handled
through Byron Okubo, plaintiff's nephew.
16.

On September 12, 1980, plaintiff received a $10,000.00 payment from

Martell Corporation.
17.

No other payments were received by plaint itf with regard to the

investment.
-3-

-3OQNCLUSIQNS OF LAW
Prom the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the following
Conclusions of Law:
1.

Byron Okubo was not the agent
it of iD l^i• IX,

2.

Plaintiff did not lend any money to defendant or to Martell or

Martell Corporation.
3.

'/«fe

No loan transaction was involved.

Plaintiff made an investment of $40,000.00 in Martell Corporation

with some assurance of security therefor to be delivered in the future.
4.

The transaction was not a consumer sale or loan under the Utah

Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
5. The document signed by defendant, Exhibit nP-ln,was not clear on
its face that it was a promise to answer for the debt of another and was not
specific as to what collateral would be delivered or as to the time of deliven
of such collateral.
6.

Exhibit "P-l" is not legally sufficient as a note or agreement to

answer for the debt of another.
7.

Exhibit "P-l" was delivered by defendant to plaintiff as a

ttjnporary surety until the delivery of security.
8.

No consideration was given or passed to defendant for the signing

of Flxhibit nP-l,f or for the investment by plaintiff m Martell Corporation.
9.

The defendant has no liability to th< plaintiff and plaintiffs

complaint should lx> dismissed on the merits as no cause of action.
10.

No attorney's fees should be awarded to either party.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE liKRFWim
DATED this %/ ^day of December,

((

_4-

Q.

And Mr. Okubo, have you calculated the

principal and interest that would be owing to you through
October 1, 1980 on this note?
A.

Yes.

0-

Do you have that figure available?

A.

I have it right here.

Q.

And it's your testimony under oath that

It's $76,695.

that amount is due and owing to you; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Dr. Parker is seated in the courtroom, is

he not, next to Mr, Marsh?
A.

Yes.

Q.

He's the one that executed the promissory

A.

Yes, he did.

0.

Did you at any time prior to the execution

note?

of this note, or afterwards, have any dealings with
Mr. Sterling Martel?
A.

Not that I know of.

Q.

Have you ever had any conversations with

A.

I never met the man until he came here

Q.

And has that man ever handed you any cash

him?

today.

or paid you anything in the way of diamonds or anything?

II

the court indicating the time that's been spent, the work
that's been spent based on a billing charge of $125 per
hour, and the affidavit contains alJ the dates that I
prepared documents, including preparation of the initial
documents after a meeting with my client, and the first
meeting, of course, was March 11, 198 3.
I had a one-hour conference with my client
at that time.

On the 14th I had a two-hour conference

regarding this matter, and then a demand letter was sent
to Dr. Parker on March 16.

On March 22, I researched the

issue of parole evidence, spent two and a half hours.
On March 22 I prepared the complaint, which took half an
hour.

On March 25, the complaint was filed, and the filing

fee of $25 is included in this as part of that fee, but
it should be reflected as a cost.

The total is $4,109.4J.1

There are also included the service of a summons and
complaint for $9, so that total amount should be reduced
from this total to effectively arrive at the attorneys'
fee .
The review of Mr. Marsh's pleading on
4-17, which was one and a half hours.

There was

preparation of interrogatories, two hours on 4-18.

On

May 22, telephone to my client concerning a reply.

On

May 22, telephone call to Mr. Marsh concerning his answer.
The time spent on that, I think I billed out at $22.50.
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